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We show that the long-run neutrality of inﬂation on capital accumulation obtained in
complete market models no longer holds when households face binding credit constraints.
Borrowing-constrained households are not able to rebalance their ﬁnancial portfolio
when inﬂation varies, and thus adjust their money holdings differently compared to
unconstrained households. This heterogeneity leads to a new precautionary savings
motive, which implies that inﬂation increases capital accumulation. We quantify the
importance of this new channel in an incomplete market model where the traditional
redistributive effects of inﬂation are also introduced. We show that this model provides
a quantitative rationale for the observed hump-shaped relationship between inﬂation and
capital accumulation.
1. Introduction
The long-run relationship between inﬂation, capital accumulation and growth, is one of the most celebrated issue in
modern macroeconomics. This tradition dates back at least to the classic monetary neutrality result of Sidrauski (1967), who
showed that money has no long-run effect on capital accumulation and output in the neoclassical growth model. This result
has been challenged by recent empirical studies which conclude on the existence of a hump-shaped relationship between
long-run inﬂation and capital accumulation. At low level of inﬂation, there is a positive relationship between inﬂation and
capital accumulation as shown by Fischer (1993), Loayza et al. (2000) or Khan et al. (2006). But this relationship becomes
negative at higher rate of inﬂation, as stressed by Bullard and Keating (1995) and Barro (1995).
These evidences on the non-neutrality of money have fueled many theoretical contributions. The literature has provided
a rationale for the non-neutrality of money by including frictions such as distorting capital taxes (Phelps, 1973 and Chari
et al., 1996 among others) and search frictions (Shi, 1999). The literature has also looked at redistributive issues of the
seigniorage rents across households (Grandmont and Younès, 1973; Kehoe et al., 1992; and Erosa and Ventura, 2002) or
across generations (Weiss, 1980; Weil, 1991). But all these studies have maintained the convenient assumption of the ab-
sence of binding borrowing constraints. They have thus abstracted from the possibility that saving decisions in capital and
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money, following changes in monetary policy could depend on the extent of binding borrowing constraints and incomplete
markets.
The aim of this paper is to contribute towards ﬁlling this gap by investigating the role of binding borrowing constraints
and heterogeneity in standard macroeconomic monetary models. The focus on borrowing constraint is motivated by two
main considerations. First, this friction is empirically relevant. The tightness of borrowing constraints is a well-established
empirical fact (Jappelli, 1990) and it is thus important to understand to what extent it interacts with monetary policy.
Second, this friction challenges some key predictions of the standard neoclassical monetary growth model. In particular we
show that the existence of borrowing constraints and incomplete markets can provide a rationale not only for the non-
neutrality of money but also for the hump-shaped relationship between inﬂation and capital. This result is the product of
two opposite effects of inﬂation that are only due to borrowing constraint and incomplete markets.
The positive effect of inﬂation on capital accumulation stems from the heterogeneity in household portfolio adjustment
depending on their capacity to borrow. If households can use both money and capital to partially self-insure against id-
iosyncratic shocks, they substitute away money for capital if inﬂation rises and the real return on money falls. This is the
traditional portfolio substitution effect that Tobin (1965) has shown in a world without credit constraint. But in presence of
ﬁnancial market imperfections, borrowing-constrained households are not able to undertake such portfolio adjustment and
they adjust their money holdings differently compared to unconstrained households. Inﬂation triggers endogenous hetero-
geneity in money holdings in presence of borrowing constraints. This heterogeneity provides incentives for unconstrained
households with positive income shocks to increase their precautionary savings in ﬁnancial assets. As a consequence, inﬂa-
tion directly affects the aggregate stock of capital and output in the long-run. This new effect due to borrowing constraint
has been ignored so far in the literature.
The negative effect of inﬂation on capital accumulation is the result of the redistributive impact of the inﬂation tax.
Lump-sum monetary transfers from the inﬂation tax provide additional insurance when markets are incomplete. The redis-
tribution of the inﬂation tax can thus decrease precautionary savings and the aggregate capital stock in the long-run. This
redistributive effect is not new and was already assessed by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kehoe et al. (1992) and more
recently by Erosa and Ventura (2002). But these papers do not show that incomplete markets can provide a rationale for
a hump-shaped relationship between inﬂation and capital accumulation since they do not investigate the so-called Tobin
effect in presence of binding credit constraints.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is theoretical. To the best of our knowledge, we provide a new channel for the
non-neutrality of money on capital accumulation and output only due to borrowing constraints. In an economy with deter-
ministic income shocks à la Woodford (1990), we show that inﬂation has a long-run effect as long as borrowing constraints
are binding. Inﬂation affects in a different way the real balances demanded by constrained and unconstrained households.
This leads to higher precautionary savings and increase capital accumulation and output. This real effect occurs even in
the absence of any other potential channels proposed so far in the literature, such as tax distortions or leisure–labor sup-
ply distortions. Importantly, this non-neutrality result also shows up when we shut down the redistributive effect of the
seigniorage rent which could provide insurance against idiosyncratic risks and could lead to a real effect of inﬂation.
The second contribution of this paper is quantitative. We show that the interplay between this new positive effect of
inﬂation on capital accumulation and the negative redistributive effect of the inﬂation tax can match the hump-shaped
relationship between inﬂation and capital. We run this quantitative analysis in an incomplete markets production economy
à la Aiyagari (1994). Ex-ante identical inﬁnitely-lived agents can accumulate interest-bearing ﬁnancial assets in the form of
capital to partially insure against individual income risks, but they face borrowing constraints. In this framework we embed
money in the utility function (MIU). Money is valued both for its liquidity service and as a store of value which provides
additional insurance against labor-market risks. Assuming money in the utility function is a reduced form to provide motives
for money demand. But it has the key advantage to introduce simple departures, namely incomplete market and borrowing
constraints, from the textbook MIU model in which money is neutral absent frictions. The analysis is carried on in an
economy in which the wealth distribution and the fraction of borrowing-constrained households closely resemble that of
the United States.
The benchmark model predicts a hump-shaped response of capital accumulation to inﬂation. At low values of the in-
ﬂation rate, the model predicts that the Tobin effect will offset the redistributive effect. For higher values of inﬂation, the
redistributive effect dominates as the lump-sum monetary transfers providing insurance increase with inﬂation. The max-
imum is reached at an annual inﬂation rate around 6 percent. This value is close to the empirical result of Bullard and
Keating (1995) who ﬁnd that the level of inﬂation maximizing the capital stock ranges between 3 percent and 6 percent in
cross-country comparison. Moreover, an increase in the annual inﬂation rate from 0 percent to 6 percent raises the aggre-
gate capital stock by 1 percent. In absolute terms, this result is quantitatively modest. But relatively to complete markets,
this effect is signiﬁcant since inﬂation would be neutral in this latter case.
We also investigate the quantitative importance of the different channels at work by looking at various redistributive
schemes of the inﬂation tax. We ﬁrst shut down the redistributive effect of the inﬂation tax to assess the quantitative
impact of the Tobin effect. We ﬁnd that the capital stock increases continuously with inﬂation. An increase in the annual
inﬂation rate from 0 percent to 6 percent is associated with a rise in the capital stock by 0.9 percent. We also assume that
the inﬂation tax might be used to decrease the distortionary taxes rather than being redistributed by lump-sum transfers.
This possibility was suggested in particular by Phelps (1973). In this case, the capital stock increases with inﬂation even in
the complete market environment. But we ﬁnd that incomplete markets and credit constraints amplify the Phelps effect. An
increase in the annual inﬂation rate from 0 percent to 6 percent is associated to a rise of the capital stock by 0.6 percent
in the complete market economy and by 2.8 percent in the incomplete market framework.
The literature on inﬂation under incomplete markets starts with the theoretical contributions of Bewley (1980, 1983).
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kehoe et al. (1992) and Imrohoroglu (1992) analyze the effect of inﬂation under incomplete
markets, but in economies where money is the only asset that can be used to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks. Akyol
(2004) analysis the effect of inﬂation in an endowment economy where both ﬁnancial assets and money coexist because of
the assumed sequence of market opening. In this environment, he considers various policies with both different public debt
and inﬂation rate, which makes it diﬃcult the identiﬁcation of the various effects. Moreover, the author is silent about the
effect of inﬂation on capital accumulation since the analysis in run in an endowment economy. The closer paper to ours is
Erosa and Ventura (2002). They analyze the redistributive effect of inﬂation in an incomplete markets production economy,
but without binding borrowing constraints. The authors introduce a transaction technology with scale effects to get real
effect of inﬂation. But in this context, the aggregate effect of inﬂation is similar under complete markets and incomplete
markets as shown by the author themselves since their mechanism hinges on the transaction technology rather than on
the market environment. In contrast, we show that heterogeneity and binding borrowing constraints yield a signiﬁcant
departure from the representative agent economy. Our result holds in a textbook macroeconomic model of money without
any scale effect in the money demand.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple model with deterministic individual shocks to show
analytically the non-neutrality of money that is only due to the existence of borrowing constraints. Section 3 lays out
the full model with stochastic uninsurable individual shocks. Section 4 quantiﬁes the real effect of inﬂation and reports
sensitivity analysis.
2. A simple model
In this section, we provide a theoretical model to show that inﬂation is no longer neutral in a production economy with
binding borrowing constraints. To obtain closed-form solutions, we set out a simpliﬁed version of the fully-ﬂedged model
used in the next quantitative section. In particular, we shut down the traditional redistributive effect of the inﬂation tax in
order to stress a new Tobin effect with borrowing constraint.
2.1. The model
The model draws upon a standard heterogeneous agent production economy à la Aiyagari (1994) in which agents face
individual income ﬂuctuations and borrowing constraints. But we make the key assumption that households alternate de-
terministically between the different labor market states. This liquidity-constrained model has been used, for instance, by
Woodford (1990) to study the effect of public debt and by Kehoe and Levine (2001) to characterize the equilibrium interest
rate. We extend this framework to monetary policy issues by taking account of the value of money in the utility func-
tion.1 We show analytically that Sidrauski’s neutrality result no longer holds when borrowing constraints are binding in this
framework. Inﬂation affects the long-run interest rate, even when seigniorage revenue is redistributed in the most neutral
way, and regardless of any other potential frictions.
2.1.1. Preferences and technology
Households are inﬁnitely-lived and have identical preferences. Each household can be in two states, H or L. In state H
(resp. L), households have a high labor endowment eH (resp. eL ). For the sake of simplicity we assume that eH = 1 and
eL = 0. Households alternate deterministically between state H and L at each period. At the initial date, there is a unit
mass of the two household types. Type 1 households are in state H at date 1, type 2 households are in state L at date 1.
Consequently, type 1 (resp. 2) households are in state H (resp. L) every odd period and in state L (resp. H) every even
period. Type i (i = 1,2) households seek to maximize an inﬁnite-horizon utility function over consumption ci and real
money balances mi which provide liquidity services. The period utility function u of these households is assumed to have
the simple form
u
(
cit,m
i
t
)= φ ln cit + (1− φ) lnmit
where 1 > φ > 0 weights the marginal utility of consumption and money. For the sake of simplicity we use a log-linear
utility function in this section. The result holds for general utility functions as shown in a technical appendix of the paper
available upon request.
At each period t  1, a type i household can use her revenue for three different purposes. She can ﬁrst buy an amount
cit of ﬁnal goods. We denote by Pt the price of the ﬁnal good in period t , and Πt+1 is the gross inﬂation rate between
1 An alternative would be to use a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. The motivations for using the money-in-the-utility function (MIU) are twofold.
Theoretically, the MIU assumption is more general and ﬂexible. Naturally, one can show that the non-neutrality result still holds under the CIA hypothesis.
Furthermore, the MIU representation directly refers to the standard Sidrauski’s neoclassical monetary model, and allows a direct assessment of the role of
borrowing constraints under this framework. The second reason has to do with the quantitative evaluation. We will calibrate the model on a quarterly basis
and it seems too extreme to assume that households must choose their money holdings one quarter in advance.
period t and period t + 1, that is Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt . She also saves an amount ait+1 of ﬁnancial assets yielding a return of
(1+ rt+1)ait+1 in period t + 1, where 1+ rt+1 is the gross real interest rate between period t and period t + 1. A borrowing
constraint is introduced in its simplest form, in that we assume that no household is able to borrow: ait+1  0. Finally, type
i household buys a nominal quantity of money Mit , which corresponds to a level of real balances m
i
t = Mit/Pt . This yields
revenue mit/Πt+1 in period t + 1. In addition to labor income and to the return on her assets, each household receives by
helicopter drop a monetary transfer from the State, denoted μit in real terms.
The problem of the type i household, i = 1,2, is given by
max
{cit ,mit ,ait+1}t=1...∞
∞∑
t=1
βtu
(
cit,m
i
t
)
with 0 < β < 1 (1)
s.t. cit +mit + ait+1 = (1+ rt)ait +
mit−1
Πt
+ wteit + μit with ait , cit,mit  0 (2)
where β stands for the discount factor, ai1 and M
i
0 = P0mi0 are given, and ait and mit are subject to the standard transversality
conditions.
The production function of the representative ﬁrm has a simple Cobb–Douglas form Kα L1−α where L stands for total
labor supply and K is the amount of total capital which fully depreciates in production. Proﬁt maximization is given by
maxKt ,Lt F (Kt , Lt) − (1+ rt)Kt − wt Lt , and yields the standard ﬁrst-order conditions
1+ rt = αKα−1t L1−αt , wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt (3)
In period t  1, ﬁnancial market equilibrium is given by Kt+1 = a1t+1 +a2t+1. Labor market equilibrium is Lt = e1t + e2t = 1.
Goods market equilibrium implies F (Kt , Lt) = Kt+1 + c1t + c2t .
2.1.2. Monetary policy with neutral redistribution
Let M¯t denotes the nominal quantity of money in circulation and Ωt = M¯t/Pt the real quantity of money in circulation
at the end of period t . Money market equilibrium implies m1t +m2t = Ωt in real terms and M1t +M2t = M¯t in nominal terms.
Let π denotes the growth rate of money. Monetary authorities provide a new nominal quantity of money in period t ,
which is proportional to the nominal quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t − 1. As a result, μ1t + μ2t =
π M¯t−1/Pt , where the initial nominal quantity of money, M¯0 = M10 +M20, is given. The law of motion of the nominal quantity
of money is thus
M¯t = (1+ π)M¯t−1 (4)
In order to focus on the speciﬁc role of borrowing constraints on the non-neutrality of inﬂation, it is assumed that
monetary authorities follow the “most” neutral rule, which is to distribute by lump-sum transfer the exact amount of
resources paid by private agents due to the inﬂation tax. Obviously this assumption is unrealistic and its only aim is to
stress the speciﬁc role of borrowing constraints regardless of any redistributive effects. As a consequence, new money is
distributed proportionally to the level of beginning-of-period money balances. In period t , type i agents have a beginning-
of-period quantity of money Mit−1. Hence, we assume that μit = πMit−1/Pt , and the real transfer is
μit =
π
Πt
mit−1 (5)
2.2. Stationary equilibrium
Given the initial conditions a11, a
2
1, M
1
0, and M
2
1, and given π , an equilibrium in this economy is a sequence
{c1t , c2t ,m1t ,m2t ,a1t+1,a2t+1, Pt , rt ,wt}t=1...∞ which satisﬁes the households’ problem (1), the ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrms’
problem (3), and the different market equilibria. More precisely, we focus on symmetric stationary equilibria, where all real
variables are constant, and where all agents in each state H and L, denoted H and L households, have the same consump-
tion and savings levels. The variables describing agents in state H will be denoted mH , cH ,aH , and those for in state L will
be described by mL, cL,aL . As a consequence, since the real quantity of money in circulation Ω = M¯t/Pt is constant in a
stationary equilibrium, Eq. (4) implies that the price of the ﬁnal good grows at rate π , and hence Π = 1+ π .
Note that under our assumption of a neutral redistributive monetary policy, we can use the budget constraint (2), and
the amount μit/Pt given by (5), to obtain the budget constraints of H and L households at the stationary equilibrium
H households: cH +mH + aH = (1+ r)aL +mL + w (6)
L households: cL +mL + aL = (1+ r)aH +mH (7)
The inﬂation rate does not appear in these equations since the creation of new money does not imply any transfer
between the two types of households. The redistributive effects of the seigniorage rent analyzed for instance by Kehoe et
al. (1992) are canceled out.
Using standard dynamic programming arguments, the households’ problem can be solved easily. This is done in
Appendix A.
For H households, we have the following optimality conditions
uc
(
cH ,mH
)= β(1+ r)uc(cL,mL) (8)
uc
(
cH ,mH
)− um(cH ,mH)= β
Π
uc
(
cL,mL
)
(9)
Eq. (8) is the Euler equation for H households, who can smooth their utility thanks to positive savings. H households are
high-income and are never borrowing constrained. The second equation is the arbitrage equation, which determines the
demand for real money balances. H households equate the marginal cost of holding money in the current period (i.e. the
left-hand side of Eq. (9)), to the marginal gain of transferring one unit of money to the following period when they are in
state L (i.e. the right-hand side of Eq. (9)). The marginal utility of money shows up here as a decrease in the opportunity
cost of holding money. And the gain from money holdings takes into account the real return 1/Π of cash.
The solution of the program of L households depends on whether borrowing constraints are binding or not. If borrowing
constraints are binding, the solution is aL = 0 and
uc
(
cL,mL
)
> β(1+ r)uc
(
cH ,mH
)
(10)
uc
(
cL,mL
)− um(cL,mL)= β
Π
uc
(
cH ,mH
)
(11)
The ﬁrst inequality shows that L households would be better off if they could transfer some income from the next period
to the current period. The second equation involves the same trade-off as that for H households discussed above. Finally, if
borrowing constraints are not binding for L households, inequality (10) becomes an equality and aL > 0.
Using expression (8) together with condition (10), we ﬁnd that borrowing constraints are binding if and only if 1 + r <
1/β . If borrowing constraints are not binding, Eq. (8) and the relationship (10) taken with equality imply 1 + r = 1/β . The
following proposition2 summarizes this standard result.
Proposition 1. Borrowing constraints are binding for L households if and only if 1+ r < 1/β . If borrowing constraints are not binding
then 1+ r = 1/β .
When borrowing constraints are binding, the gross real interest rate 1+ r is lower than the inverse of the discount factor.
As a result, there is always capital over-accumulation due to the precautionary saving motive, which is a standard result in
this type of liquidity-constrained model (see Woodford, 1990; Kehoe and Levine, 2001, amongst others). The next section
establishes suﬃcient conditions for borrowing constraints to be binding in this simple framework.
2.3. Monetary policy with binding borrowing constraints
2.3.1. Perfect ﬁnancial markets
As a starting point, we present the conditions required to produce Sidrauski’s neutrality result in this simple framework.
If markets were complete and borrowing constraints were not binding, the Euler equation would hold with equality what-
ever the state of the labor market. In this case, money demand would be identical across households of types H and L.
Using a log utility speciﬁcation and taking the Euler equation with equality, we can rewrite money demand as follows
mH
cH
= m
L
cL
= 1− φ
φ
1
1− 1
Π
1
1+r
(12)
In this case, whatever the current state and the history of the labor market, the ratio of money over consumption is
determined only by the preference parameters and the opportunity cost of holding money. To see this, assume that r and
π are small, so that 1− 1/(1+ π)(1+ r)  r − (−π), which is the difference between the real net return on ﬁnancial titles
and the real net return on money or, in other words, the nominal interest rate.
In this case, inﬂation has no real effect on savings since households adjust their money demand in exactly the same pro-
portion following a rise in inﬂation. Inﬂation does not then bring about any intra-period heterogeneity between household
H and L; it therefore has no effect on saving patterns for inter-period smoothing motives, or on the equilibrium interest
rate. This is the traditional Sidrauski result regarding the long-run neutrality of money.
2 Note that 1+ r cannot be lower than 1/Π , otherwise ﬁnancial markets cannot clear. As such, an equilibrium with binding credit constraints can exist
only if 1/Π < 1/β . Moreover, we assume that the surplus left for consumption is positive at the Friedman rule, which implies α < 1/Π .
2.3.2. Binding borrowing constraints
This long-run neutrality result no longer holds in this simple framework when borrowing constraints are binding.
Since H households are never borrowing-constrained and proﬁt from their good employment state to accumulate a
buffer ﬁnancial stock, their Euler equation always holds with equality. The money demand of H households is therefor still
only determined by the opportunity cost of holding money
mH
cH
= 1− φ
φ
1
1− 1
Π
1
1+r
(13)
By contrast, the money demand of L households might be affected, depending on whether borrowing constraints are
binding since the Euler equation no longer holds with equality. When borrowing constraints are binding, that is when
1+ r < 1
β
, we have the following money demand equation from (8) and (11):
mL
cL
= 1− φ
φ
1
1− β2
Π
(1+ r)
(14)
The equilibrium ratio for L households is not simply determined by the opportunity cost of holding money, but by the
difference between consumption in the current period and the return on money holdings two periods hence. The ratio
β2(1 + r)/Π is the discounted value of one unit of money held in state L, transferred to state H , and then saved via
ﬁnancial market on to the next period, where the household is in state L again. As this ratio rises, L households increase
the ratio of their money holdings over their consumption. L households then increase the relative demand for money as the
real interest increases, contrary to H households. The real interest rate appears here as the remuneration of future savings
and not as the opportunity cost of holding money. The following proposition summarizes this key property of the model.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. If α < 1/(2 + β), there exists an unique equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints. In such an equilibrium, the
real interest rate falls as inﬂation rises.3
When borrowing constraints are binding, a rise in inﬂation triggers a heterogeneous response in money demand across
households. L households decrease their money holdings mL proportionately less than do H households, because money is
their only available store of value. As a result, H households have more resources since their budget constraint is cH +aH =
w + mL − mH . An increase in inﬂation thus provides an incentive for H households to save more in order to smooth
consumption between periods. Thus in this simple framework with binding borrowing constraints, inﬂation unambiguously
favors capital accumulation and output, in line with the traditional result of Tobin (1965).
This simple model has shown that imperfections on ﬁnancial markets give rise to heterogeneity in money demand, which
is at the core of the non-neutrality of inﬂation. Finally, the well-known distributional effect of the inﬂation tax (Scheinkman
and Weiss, 1986; Kehoe et al., 1992) has been canceled in this simple model where money is distributed proportionally to
the beginning-of-period money holdings. In the general model below the redistribution of the inﬂation is likely to play an
additional role. Note that this last effect depends only on incomplete markets and not on credit constraints being actually
binding. The next section provides a quantitative evaluation of these channels.
3. The general model
We now describe a fully-ﬂedged model including more general assumptions about idiosyncratic risks, endogenous labor
supply and distorting taxes in order to investigate quantitatively the role of inﬂation. The economy considered here is based
on the traditional heterogeneous agent framework à la Aiyagari (1994). However, we embed money in the utility function
in this framework. This section presents the most general model. Different speciﬁcations of this model will be used in the
simulation exercise to disentangle the various channels through which inﬂation affects the real economy.
3.1. Agents
3.1.1. Households
The economy consists of a unit mass of ex ante identical and inﬁnitely-lived households. They maximize expected dis-
counted utility from consumption c, from leisure and real balances m = MP . Labor endowment per period is normalized to 1,
working time is l and thus leisure is 1 − l. For the sake of generality, we follow the literature which directly introduces
money m in the utility function of private agents to capture its liquidity services. For the benchmark version of the model,
3 Condition holds for α = 1/3, β < 1 and Π > 1, for instance.
we assume that the utility function has a general CES speciﬁcation, following Chari et al. (2000). The utility of agent i is
given by
u(ci,mi, li) = 11− σ
[(
ωc
η−1
η
i + (1− ω)m
η−1
η
i
) η
η−1
(1− li)ψ
]1−σ
(15)
where ω is the share parameter, η is the interest elasticity of the demand for real balances, ψ is the weight of leisure and
σ is risk aversion.
Individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks on their labor productivity et . We assume that et follows a three-state
Markov process over time with et ∈ E = {eh, em, el}, where eh stands for high productivity, em for medium productivity,
and el for low productivity. The productivity process follows a 3 × 3 transition matrix4 Q . The probability distribution
across productivity is represented by a vector nt = {nht ,nmt ,nlt}: nt  0 and nht + nmt + nlt = 1. Under technical conditions,
that we assume to be fulﬁlled, the transition matrix has a unique vector n∗ = {nh,nm,nl} such that n∗ = n∗Q . Hence, nt
converges toward n∗ in the long run. n∗ is distribution of the population in each state. For instance, nh is the proportion of
the population with high labor productivity. In the general model, there is endogenous labor supply for each productivity
level.
Markets are incomplete and no borrowing is allowed. In line with Aiyagari (1994), households can self-insure against
employment risks by accumulating a riskless asset a which yields a return r. But they can also accumulate real money
assets m = M/P , which introduces a new channel compared to the previous heterogeneous agent literature. With the price
level of the ﬁnal good at period t being denoted Pt , the gross inﬂation rate between period t − 1 and period t is Πt = PtPt−1 .
If a household holds a real amount mt−1 of money at the end of period t − 1, the real value of her money balances at
period t is mt−1
Πt
. As long as Πt > 11+rt , money is a strictly-dominated asset, but which will nonetheless be in demand for its
liquidity services. As before, μit denote the lump sum transfers from the government received by agent i, expressed in real
terms. Households are not allowed to borrow and cannot issue any money.
The budget constraint of household i at period t is given by
cit +mit + ait+1 = (1+ rt)ait +
mit−1
Πt
+ wteitlit + μit t = 0,1, . . . (16)
where (1+ r0)ai0 and mi−1 are given. The sequence of constraints on the choice variables is
ait+1  0, 1 lit  0, cit  0, mit  0 t = 0,1, . . . (17)
The value rt is the after-tax return on ﬁnancial assets, eit is the productivity level of the worker in period t , and wt is
after-tax labor income per eﬃcient unit.
For the sake of realism, we assume that there is a linear tax on private income. The tax rate on both capital and labor
income at period t is denoted χt . Letting r˜t and w˜t denote capital cost and labor cost per eﬃcient unit, the returns for
households then satisfy the following relationships
rt = r˜t(1− χt)
wt = w˜t(1− χt)
Let qit denote total wealth in period t
qit = (1+ rt)ait +
mit−1
Πt
With this deﬁnition, the program of agent i can be written in the following recursive form
v
(
qit, e
i
t
)= max
{cit ,mit ,lt ,ait+1,}
u
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)+ βE[v(qit+1, eit+1)]
s.t. cit +mit + ait+1 = qit + wtetlit + μit
with the sequence of constraints on the choice variables in (17) and the transition probabilities for labor productivity given
by the matrix Q .
Since the effect of inﬂation on individual behavior depends heavily on whether borrowing constraints are binding, we
distinguish two cases.
4 This assumption is based on Domeij and Heathcote (2004), who found that at least three employment states are needed to ﬁt crucial empirical features
of the employment process and wealth distribution. See the section devoted to the speciﬁcation of the model parameters.
• Non-binding borrowing constraints
In this case, the ﬁrst-order conditions of agent i are as follows
uc
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)= β(1+ rt+1)E[v1(qit+1, eit+1)] (18)
uc
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)− um(cit,mit, lit)= βΠt+1 E
[
v1
(
qit+1, eit+1
)]
(19)
ul
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)= −wtetuc(cit,mit, lit) (20)
Eq. (20) only holds if the solution satisﬁes lit ∈ [0;1]. Otherwise, lit takes on a corner value, and the solution is given by
(18) and (19).
Let γt+1 denote the real cost of money holdings
γt+1 ≡ 1− 1
Πt+1
1
(1+ rt+1)
This indicator measures the opportunity cost of holding money. When the after-tax nominal interest rate rnt+1, deﬁned by
1 + rnt+1 = Πt+1(1 + rt+1), is small enough, then γt+1  rnt+1. With this notation and the expression of the utility function
given in (15) above, the ﬁrst-order conditions (18) and (19) yield
mit =
(
1− ω
ω
1
γt+1
)η
cit
This equation shows that the money demand of unconstrained households is only affected by the substitution effect,
which depends on the opportunity cost of holding money.
• Binding borrowing constraints
When the household problem yields a negative value for ﬁnancial savings, borrowing constraints are binding, at+1 = 0,
and the ﬁrst-order condition yields the inequality
uc
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)
> β(1+ rt+1)E
[
v1
(
qit+1, eit+1
)]
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the constrained problem are given by
uc
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)− um(cit,mit, lit)= 1Πt+1 βE
[
v1
(
mit
Πt+1
, eit+1
)]
(21)
ul
(
cit,m
i
t, l
i
t
)= −wtetuc(cit,mit, lit) (22)
There is no simple expression for money demand in the case of binding constraints. The static trade-off between money
demand and consumption demand appears on the left-hand side of (21). Were money not to be a store of value, this
expression would be equal to 0. However, as money allows individuals to transfer income to the next period, this introduces
an additional motive for holding money.
The right-hand side of Eq. (21) makes clear that inﬂation has two opposing effects on the demand for money by
borrowing-constrained households. On the one hand, inﬂation induces a substitution effect which serves to decrease money
demand as inﬂation rises (represented by the term 1/Πt+1); on the other hand, as inﬂation enters the value function via a
revenue effect, there might be an increase in money demand as inﬂation increases.
The core reason for this result is that money is the only store of value which can be adjusted if households are
borrowing-constrained. If the function v is very concave, and for realistic parameter values, this second effect may dom-
inate, and the demand for money can increase with inﬂation. We will show in the quantitative analysis that this result
holds for the poorest agents. As a consequence, this case proves that the change in money demand resulting from inﬂa-
tion, the so-called Tobin effect, can be decomposed into a revenue effect and a substitution effect for borrowing-constrained
households.
Finally, working hours are determined by Eq. (22). If the value of lt from (22) is negative, then lt = 0 and the ﬁrst-order
condition (22) holds with inequality.
The solution of the households’ program provides a sequence of functions which yield at each date the policy rules for
consumption, ﬁnancial savings, money balances and leisure as a function of the level of labor productivity and wealth:
ct(.,.) : E ×R+ −→R+
at+1(.,.) : E ×R+ −→R+
mt(.,.) : E ×R+ −→R+
lt(.,.) : E ×R+ −→R+
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
t = 0,1, . . .
3.1.2. Firms
We assume that all markets are competitive and that the only good consumed is produced by a representative ﬁrm
with aggregate Cobb–Douglas technology. Let Kt and Lt stand for aggregate capital and aggregate effective labor used in
production respectively. It is assumed that capital depreciates at a constant rate δ and is installed one period ahead of
production. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, aggregate employment and, more generally, aggregate variables are
constant at the stationary equilibrium
Output is given by
Yt = F (Kt , Lt) = Kαt L1−αt 0 < α < 1
Effective labor supply is equal to Lt = Lht eh + Lmt em + Lltel , where Lht , Lmt and Llt are the aggregate demand for each type of
labor. Prices are set competitively:
w˜t = (1− α)(Kt/Lt)α (23)
r˜t + δ = α(Kt/Lt)α−1 (24)
3.1.3. Government
The government levies taxes to ﬁnance a public good, which costs G units of ﬁnal goods in each period. Taxes are
proportional to the revenue of capital and labor, with coeﬃcients χt in period t . In addition, the government receives the
revenue of the new money created at period t , denoted τ tott in real terms. It is assumed that the government does not issue
any debt. Finally, the total transfer to households is the sum of the lump sum transfer over the whole population,
∫ 1
0 μ
i
t di.
The government budget constraint is given by
1∫
0
μit di + G = χt r˜t Kt + χt
(
Lht e
h
t + Lltelt + Lmt emt
)
w˜t + τ tott (25)
3.1.4. Monetary policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a simple rule. In each period, the monetary authorities create an amount of
money that is proportional, with factor π, to the nominal quantity of money in circulation, PtΩt = Pt−1Ωt−1 +π Pt−1Ωt−1
where Ωt stands for aggregate real money and Mt = Ωt Pt stands for nominal money. As it is standard in the monetary
literature, we assume that the State receives all the revenue from the inﬂation tax.5 As a result the real quantity of money
in circulation at period t is
Ωt = Ωt−1
Πt
+ π Ωt−1
Πt
(26)
The real value of the inﬂation tax in period t is
τ tott = π
Ωt−1
Πt
(27)
Note that if the real quantity of money in circulation is constant (which is the case in equilibrium), Eq. (26) implies that
Π = 1+ π , and hence τ tot = π1+π Ω , which is the standard expression for the inﬂation tax.
3.2. Equilibrium
3.2.1. Market equilibria
Let λt : E ×R+ −→ [0,1] denote the joint distribution of agents over productivity and wealth. Aggregate consumption Ct ,
aggregate real money holdings Mt/Pt , aggregate effective labor Lst and aggregate ﬁnancial savings At+1 are respectively
given by
Ct =
∫ ∫
ct
(
ek,q
)
dλt
(
ek,q
)
Mt/Pt =
∫ ∫
mt
(
ek,q
)
dλt
(
ek,q
)
Lst = eh
∫
lt
(
eh,q
)
λt
(
eh,q
)
dq + el
∫
lt
(
el,q
)
λt
(
el,q
)
dq + em
∫
lt
(
em,q
)
λt
(
em,q
)
dq
At+1 =
∫ ∫
at+1
(
ek,q
)
dλt
(
ek,q
)
5 In practice, the proﬁts of Central Banks are redistributed to the State and are not used for speciﬁc purposes.
Table 1
Benchmark calibration.
Parameters β α δ ω η ψ σ
Values 0.99 0.36 0.025 0.988 0.5 2 1
Equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market implies
Ct + Kt+1 + Gt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt (28)
Equilibrium in the labor market is
Lt = Lst
Equilibrium in the ﬁnancial market implies
Kt+1 = At+1 (29)
Last, money-market equilibrium is deﬁned by
Mt/Pt = Ωt (30)
where Ωt is the real quantity of money in circulation at period t .
3.2.2. Competitive equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of constant decision rules c(e,q), m(e,q), l(e,q) and a(e,q)
for consumption, real balances, leisure and capital holdings respectively, the steady state joint distribution over wealth and
productivity λ(e,q), a constant real return on ﬁnancial assets r, a constant real wage w , the real return on real balances
1/Π , and taxes χ , consistent with the exogenous supply of money π and government public spending G such that
1. The long-run distribution of productivity is given by a constant vector n∗ .
2. The functions a(.,.), c(.,.),m(.,.), l(.,.) solve the households’ problem.
3. The joint distribution λ over productivity and wealth is time invariant.
4. Factor prices are competitively determined by Eqs. (23)–(24).
5. Markets clear: Eqs. (28)–(30).
6. The quantity of money in circulation follows the law of motion (26).
7. The tax rate χ is constant and deﬁned to balance the budget of the State (25), where the seigniorage rent from the
inﬂation tax τ tot is given by (27).
Note that equilibrium on the money market and stationary of the joint distribution imply that the real quantity of money
in circulation is constant.
3.3. Parameterization
We parameterize the model by using data from the U.S. economy. The ﬁrst critical point of the parametrization is the
choice of the model period to generate a reasonable inﬂation tax base. Since real balances consist of liquid assets, we
choose a model period equals to one quarter rather than one year, consistently with the previous quantitative literature
on the inﬂation tax (see Erosa and Ventura, 2002, or Cooley and Hansen, 1989, among others). The key targets of this
parametrization are the wealth distribution, including the share of borrowing-constrained individuals, the individual process
of income ﬂuctuations, the interest-elasticity of money demand and the key ratio of M1/Y and K/Y . In what follows
we focus on the benchmark incomplete market economy described above with endogenous prices, proportional taxes, and
endogenous labor. We calibrate the model for an initial quarterly rate of inﬂation π of 0.75 percent. This initial inﬂation
rate corresponds to an inﬂation rate of 3 percent per year, which corresponds to the average inﬂation rate over the period
1980–2006. In the benchmark case, we set the level of lump-sum transfers to be 0 when inﬂation is equal to 0.75 percent.
3.3.1. Technology and preferences
Table 1 shows the parameters for preferences and technology. Parameter values for the utility function (15) are chosen
as follows.
The ﬁrst key parameter is the interest elasticity of money. We follow the estimates of Hoffman et al. (1995) who ﬁnd
an interest elasticity of money demand close to 0.5 in the United States. We thus set η equal to 0.5 in the benchmark
parameterization. However, the interest elasticity of money demand seems to be estimated imprecisely in the literature.
Holman (1998) provides an estimate of η close to 1 by directly estimating the parameters of the utility function on a long-
run period in the U.S. from 1989 to 1991. This result suggests that in the long-run the data fails to reject the Cobb–Douglas
assumption. In contrast, Chari et al. (2000) estimate a much lower value of the interest elasticity. We will thus check the
robustness of our results in the sensitivity analysis by running different experiments with η = 1 and η = 0.25.
Table 2
Steady-state values.
π r˜ χ w K Y Ω
Benchmark 0.75% 0.39% 0.29 2.64 17.04 1.37 0.72
Table 3
Wealth distribution.
U.S. data Benchmark model
Gini 0.82 0.72
Percentage of households borrowing
constrained
[2%, 19%] 6%
Cumulative distribution of wealth
held by:
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 0.09 2.62
2nd quintile (bottom 40%) 0.2 4.14
3rd quintile (bottom 60%) 4.0 5.33
4th quintile (bottom 80%) 15.3 21.56
80–100% 84.7 78.44
99–100% 34.3 7.3
Next, we pin down the value of the share parameter ω to match the ratio of M1 over output. For the period 1980–2006,
the ratio M1/GNP reached on average 13.2 percent at the annual level for an average yearly inﬂation rate of 3 percent. We
thus set ω = 0.988 to match the corresponding ratio M1/GNP at a quarterly frequency. The weight on leisure ψ is set to
reproduce a steady state fraction of labor of 33 percent of total time endowment. The risk aversion is set at a standard
value of σ = 1 as in Chari et al. (2000) baseline case. The parameters relating to the production technology and the capital’s
share also take on their standard values: α is set equal to 0.36 and the capital depreciation rate is 0.025. The value of
the discounting factor is then set equal to β = 0.99 so as to reproduce a capital/output ratio of 12.5 at the quarterly level
(Cooley, 1995). Eventually, we set G = 0.28 to reproduce a share of G over GDP of 20 percent. Given the value of G , we ﬁnd
that the budget of the government is balanced for an average tax rate on labor and capital equal to χ = 0.29, which is close
to the values observed for that period (Domeij and Heathcote, 2004). Table 2 reports the corresponding steady-state values
of the main aggregates of the model.
3.3.2. Employment process
An important aspect of the parameterization is to ﬁnd a stylized process for wages which is both empirically relevant
and able to replicate the U.S. wealth distribution such as the Gini coeﬃcient and the share of people who are borrowing-
constrained. We follow the traditional quantitative macroeconomic literature by assuming a ﬁrst-order autoregressive pro-
cess for wages or earnings. Various authors have estimated these parameters by using PSID data, and found a coeﬃcient
of autocorrelation close to 0.9 and a standard deviation of innovation in the range 0.12 and 0.25 (see Hubbard et al., 1995;
Heathcote et al., 2005). However the stochastic process of relevance in our framework pertains to wages since hours are
endogenous. We thus draw on Floden and Lindé (2001) who estimated, at the annual level, a model with a labor supply
choice and thus focused on a process for wage rather than earnings. We use their ﬁndings by imposing that the quarterly
Markov process can reproduce a coeﬃcient of autocorrelation equal to 0.91 and a standard deviation in the innovation term
equal to 0.22 at the annual level.
The second issue is to ﬁnd a process able to match the observed Gini coeﬃcient of wealth and the extent of households
who are borrowing constrained. To that respect we follow the current literature (see among others Domjei and Heathcote,
2004) which shows that a Markov chain with three states and nil probabilities to transit between extreme states could
make a good job in matching the Gini index. We thus assume a set of employment states represented by E = {eh, em, el}
where eh stands for high productivity, em for medium productivity, and el for low productivity. And we assume that ph,l =
pl,h = 0. This leaves us with four restrictions to identify the Markov process. Two restrictions are given by the previous
autocorrelation process and the standard error of the innovation in the wage process. The two other parameters are chosen
so that to obtain a realistic Gini index for wealth equals to 0.72 and a share of borrowing constraint households equals
to 6 percent. This calibration procedure delivers parameters values that satisfy all four criteria. The implied probability of
transitions are pl,l = ph,h = 0.9750 and pm,m = 0.9925, and the ratio for productivity values are e1/e2 = 4.64 and e2/e3 =
5.65.
Table 3 summarizes the relevant variables for the wealth distribution (net worth) based on the Survey of Consumer
Finance 2004. We use the estimates of the U.S. wealth distribution given by Wolff (2007). The model predicts a fairly high
Gini index, equal to 0.72, but still underestimates the Gini found in the data, equal to 0.82. The model does a reasonably
good job in matching the lower tail of the U.S. wealth distribution. It reproduces a positive share of borrowing constrained
households. It also predicts a very low share of wealth held by the bottom 20 percent, 40 percent and 60 percent, even
if these shares are overestimated compared to that found in the SCF 2004. The model also matches reasonably well the
upper quintile of the distribution. It predicts that the top 20 percent hold 78.44 percent of the wealth while they hold
84.7 percent in the data. However, our model fails in matching the share of the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution.
This category holds 34.7 percent of the wealth in the data against 7.3 percent in the model. This ﬂaw is common to the
different models which use only idiosyncratic income risks to reproduce the wealth distribution (see Heathcote, 2005).
Taking into account entrepreneurship or stochastic discounting factor might be necessary to improve the model along this
line, but this is beyond the scope of the paper (see Quadrini, 2000 and Krusell and Smith, 1998, for seminal attempts).
The Gini coeﬃcient in consumption is 0.30, consistent with Krueger and Perri (in press). The empirical measure of the
share of borrowing constrained households heavily depends on the choice of the indicator chosen. By using information on
the number of borrowing requests which were rejected in the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), Jappelli showed that up
to 19 percent of families are liquidity constrained. But by using updated SCF data, Budria Rodriguez et al. (2002) reported
that only 2.5 percent of household have zero wealth, which might correspond to our theoretical borrowing limit in the
model. Obviously this ﬁgure does not mean that these households are liquidity-constrained. In particular, Budria Rodriguez
et al. (2002) also report that 6 percent of households have delayed their debt repayments for two months or more, which
could be used as another proxy for liquidity constraints. To this extent, our measure of 6 percent of liquidity-constrained
individuals in our model can be considered as an intermediate value, which prevents us from over-estimating the effect of
borrowing constraints on the non-neutrality of inﬂation.6
We will study other environment where pubic spending are set to 0. In this case, we change the parameter of the utility
function β and ω to start from the same steady states for K/Y and M1/Y when the quarterly inﬂation rate is equal to
0.75 percent. The other parameters are unchanged.
4. Results
4.1. Individual policy rules
We start by discussing the impact of inﬂation on individual policy rules in the benchmark economy with endogenous
hours and taxes.
Fig. 1 illustrates the main policy rules in the benchmark economy with an inﬂation rate of 0.75 percent.7 Consumption,
real balances and ﬁnancial assets are an increasing function of labor productivity and current total wealth q, made up of
ﬁnancial assets and cash. But due to the presence of borrowing constraints, the value functions and the implied policy
rules for consumption and money demand are concave at the low values of wealth and productivity. Moreover the policy
rule for ﬁnancial assets held by medium- and low-productivity workers displays kinks at low levels of wealth, indicating
that these two types of workers are net-dissavers. By contrast high productivity workers are net-savers in order to smooth
consumption across less favorable productivity states.
Fig. 2 shows the impact of a permanent variation in inﬂation from π = 0.5% to π = 0.75%, on next-period asset holdings
and money balances as a function of total beginning of period wealth. The focus is on policy rules around the kink where
the main non-linearity lies. We focus on the high productivity state and the low productivity state, as households in the
medium state have similar policy rules than low-productivity households. For the high value of productivity, an increase
in inﬂation provides more incentives to save via ﬁnancial assets at the expense of real money balances whose value has
been slashed by inﬂation. This behavior stands in sharp contrast with that of households in lower productivity states. These
households are borrowing-constrained on asset holdings at the low level of total wealth. In this case they have no alternative
but to carry over higher level of money balances following a rise in inﬂation in order to smooth their consumption. Money
is used as a store of value, and the revenue effect dominates the substitution effect when wealth is low, as explained in
the discussion of Eq. (21). Their level of real-money balances decreases only at the higher level of total wealth for which
borrowing constraints on ﬁnancial assets are no longer binding and households can thus use their capital as a buffer stock.
This contrasting effect suggests that the impact of inﬂation on the real economy and welfare crucially depends on borrowing
constraints. Moreover, these policy rules show that wealth-poor households hold a higher fraction of their wealth in real
balances compared to wealth-rich households. This endogenous outcome is consistent with the data (see Erosa and Ventura,
2002).
4.2. Aggregate results
We quantify the effects of inﬂation under different assumptions regarding the redistribution of the seigniorage rent, the
tax structure and the adjustment of labor supply. The quantitative analysis proceeds as follows.
6 Our model with capital and real balances yields quite naturally a positive number of people who are liquidity-constrained with the employment process
at stake. This result is due to the introduction of real balances in the traditional Aiyagari model. The previous literature generally uses stochastic discounting
factors to ﬁt this dimension (Krusell and Smith, 1998; Carroll, 2000). We do not follow this strategy since the goal of this paper is to look at the speciﬁc
role of credit constraints and incomplete markets in the non-neutrality of money regardless of any additional heterogeneity, in particular with respect to
preferences.
7 We calculate the policy rules with value function iteration. We use a grid of 8000 points and an increment of 0.015 on the interval for wealth [0,120].
The standard Euler equation error, averaged over the grid points and the productivity status, reaches 0.004 percent.
Fig. 1. Individual policy rules.
Fig. 2. Effect of inﬂation on individual policy rules.
Fig. 3. Capital and money as a function of the quarterly inﬂation rate, exogenous labor, lump-sum monetary transfers proportional to beginning of period
real balances.
First we consider a version of the model in which hours are exogenous and money creation is redistributed proportionally
to the beginning-of-period real balances of households. Households regard these transfers as lump-sum ones. We thus
abstract from any redistributive and distortionary issues discussed in the previous literature. Consistent with our theoretical
results in Section 2, this set-up allows us to quantify the non-neutrality of monetary policy which transits through borrowing
constraints only. This framework is thus mainly illustrative because if markets were complete the neutrality of money would
apply under these assumptions.
Second, we take into account the traditional redistributive effect of inﬂation and assess its interaction with borrowing
constraints. Money creation is made by helicopter drops and distributed equally across households. In this case, money
creation and inﬂation consist in a transfer from cash-rich households to cash-poor households. Money creation provides
thus an additional insurance and interact with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints. Labor supply is still assumed
to be exogenous.
Third, we consider the benchmark model described above in which labor supply is endogenous and taxes are distor-
tionary. We quantify the effect of inﬂation under two assumptions. We start by assuming that the newly money created,
that is the inﬂation tax, is redistributed equally to all households through an helicopter drop. Next, we assess the impact of
the inﬂation tax on other distorting taxes: The increase in the inﬂation tax is assumed to decrease the distortion on capital
tax and labor tax. This effect is often called the Phelps effect, as Phelps (1973) introduces this effect to justify a positive
inﬂation rate.
The calibration given above corresponds to the cases three and four. In each other cases, we adjust the discounting factor
β and parameter of the utility function ω are adjusted to start from the same initial capital-output ratio and money-output
ratio.
4.2.1. Proportional lump-sum transfers and exogenous labor
We assume that each household supplies inelastically l = l¯ hours of labor. We set l¯ = 0.33, which corresponds to the
steady state value of labor with endogenous labor supply. In this speciﬁcation, government spending is set to zero G = 0,
there are no distortionary taxes χ = 0, and all the monetary transfers are lump-sum.8 The government redistributes the
new money proportionally to the beginning of period level of real balances held by each household. In consequence, the
real transfer to households i in period t is simply π
Πt
mit−1. This environment corresponds to the simple model presented in
Section 2 but with a more general labor income process. With this assumptions, the budget constraint (16) is cit +ait+1+mit =
(1+ r˜t)ait + w˜teit l¯ +mit−1. Here inﬂation no longer appears in the individual budget constraint. But since the seigniorage tax
is redistributed ex-post, the inﬂation rate is still taken into account by households as the anticipated inﬂation rate affects
the arbitrage conditions to hold money.
Fig. 3 shows the effect of inﬂation on aggregate capital and the demand for real balances in this set-up. Consistently
with the theoretical ﬁndings, inﬂation is non-neutral in this environment and triggers an increase in precautionary saving
motives and the aggregate capital stock. This is the new Tobin effect in an environment with incomplete markets and biding
borrowing constraints. Aggregate output mimics the evolution pattern of the capital stock since labor supply is exogenous
in this set-up. The relation between inﬂation and capital accumulation is monotonic but the marginal effect of inﬂation is
decreasing (δK/δπ > 0 and δ2K/δπ2 < 0). The increase in the capital stock reaches 1.3 percent when the quarterly inﬂation
rate increase from 0 percent to 10 percent. The real money demand decreases continuously with inﬂation. The implied
interest elasticity of money demand is of 0.5 due to the calibration of the model.
8 The fact that the amount of transfers is taken as given by the households can be justiﬁed by the following argument. The government is able to solve
the money demand of households as a function of the history of their idiosyncratic shocks. The transfer is made conditionally on the history of the income
shocks and not on the choice variables of the households. The households consider thus this transfer as lump-sum.
Fig. 4. Capital and transfers as a function of the quarterly inﬂation rate, exogenous labor, symmetric lump-sum monetary transfers.
Under complete markets and non-distorting taxes, the impact of inﬂation on capital is nil. Inﬂation has no real effect on
the stationary values of the real aggregate variables. Individuals adjust their real balances and ﬁnancial assets in the same
proportions, leading to a neutral effect of inﬂation on real variables, such as consumption, capital and output.
4.2.2. Redistributive effects of the inﬂation tax
We now quantify the interaction between incomplete markets and the redistribution of the inﬂation tax. We assume
that all agents receive the same fraction of the inﬂation tax from the monetary authorities μit = π Ωt−1Πt . This experiment
refers basically to the helicopter drop model with symmetric transfers. As the monetary transfers to all households increase
with the inﬂation level, this experiment introduces an additional insurance effect of inﬂation, which goes in the opposite
direction to the previous Tobin effect. The incentives for self-insurance through capital accumulation thus decreases. We still
assume exogenous labor supply and zero government spending G = 0. The budget constraint of households is given by (16)
with μit = π Ωt−1Πt , lit = l¯.
Fig. 4 shows the impact of inﬂation in this environment. The left panel reports the evolution of aggregate capital as
a function of inﬂation. The evolution pattern is now hump-shaped, reaching a peak for a quarterly inﬂation rate of 1.5
percent. The Tobin channel offsets the insurance channel at low levels of inﬂation. But the insurance effect, brought about
by the monetary transfers of the inﬂation tax, dominates at higher levels of inﬂation.
The right panel of Fig. 4 highlights the insurance channel by reporting the relationship between inﬂation and the real
transfers μ, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Although the real quantity of money decreases, the monetary transfers
increases with inﬂation since the interest elasticity of money demand is lower than 1. As the insurance brought about
by the monetary transfers increases with inﬂation, the self-insurance motives decrease. Importantly enough, the insurance
effect is also only due to the existence of incomplete markets and borrowing constraints. Inﬂation would still have no real
effect in this environment if markets were to be complete.
4.2.3. Endogenous labor, distorting taxes and redistribution of inﬂation taxes
We now consider the benchmark model with distorting taxes end endogenous labor supply. We compare two redistribu-
tive schemes of the inﬂation tax. First, as in the previous helicopter drop experiment, we assume that the inﬂation tax is
redistributed equally to all households. In the second environment, the additional inﬂation tax is used to decrease distorting
taxes on labor and capital.
4.2.3.1. Symmetric lump-sum redistribution of the inﬂation tax In lines with the calibration of the benchmark model presented
above, we assume that public spending G is positive and ﬁnanced through distortionary taxes. But the inﬂation tax provides
additional revenue to be redistributed. All agents receive the same monetary transfers. Importantly, the inﬂation tax is not
used by the government to modify the distortionary taxes, which remain ﬁxed at their steady-state values χ¯ . To start from
the same steady state, we consider that the monetary transfers from the inﬂation tax are nil when the inﬂation rate is equal
to 0.75 percent. As before, the budget constraint of households is given by (16) when μit = π Ωt−1Πt , G > 0, χt = χ¯ and lit
endogenous.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution pattern of the main aggregates as a function of the inﬂation rate. The solid lines correspond to
the case with equal lump-sum redistribution of the inﬂation tax. Consistently with the above experiment, the capital stock
follows a hump-shaped evolution. The new effect here only comes from the endogeneization of the labor supply. Fig. 5 –
left panel – shows that labor supply decreases monotonically with inﬂation. This evolution is the result of the insurance
effect of the inﬂation tax. The increase in the monetary transfers provide additional insurance and lower the incentives to
work for self-insurance motives. This effect always dominates the substitution effect linked to the rise in the capital stock
and in labor productivity at low level of inﬂation. For high level of inﬂation, both the insurance and the substitution effect
go in the same direction and lead to a sharper decrease in labor supply.
Fig. 5. Benchmark model: symmetric monetary transfers versus changes in distorting taxes.
As a consequence of the evolution pattern of capital and labor, output follows a non-monotonic evolution pattern. The
rise in the capital stock at low levels of inﬂation offsets the decline in labor supply, and leads to an increase in output. In
contrast, output declines for higher levels of the inﬂation rate.
To provide a quantitative sense of the results, Table 4 – line 1 shows the variation in the aggregate variables when the
quarterly inﬂation rate increases from 0.5 percent to 0.75 percent. The capital stock increases by 0.139 percent and the
money stock decreases by 12.79 percent. The increase in lump-sum monetary transfers provide some insurance that leads
to a decrease in labor supply by 0.03 percent. The net effect on output is an increase by 0.029 percent. Table 4 – line 2
shows that the real effect of inﬂation would be nil if markets were to be complete.
This environment with lump-sum monetary transfers is likely to be the most relevant for the analysis of the long-
run effect of inﬂation. There is little evidence that distorting taxes decrease when inﬂation increases. But as a theoretical
investigation, we nevertheless study this case below.
Table 4
Aggregate impact of inﬂation – benchmark model.
Percentage change following a rise in quarterly inﬂation
π = 0.5% → 0.75%
Redistribution of the inﬂation tax: Lump-sum transfersa
Y K M/P C L χ r˜ w˜
Incomplete markets 0.029 0.139 −12.79 −0.015 −0.030 0 −0.83 0.06
Complete markets 0 0 −12.80 0 0 0 0 0
Redistribution of the inﬂation tax: Change in distorting taxesb
Incomplete markets 0.182 0.380 −12.73 0.121 0.062 −0.540 −1.454 0.112
Complete markets 0.056 0.085 −12.79 0.063 0.041 −0.467 −0.029 0.016
a The inﬂation tax is redistributed by lump-sum monetary transfers to all agents.
b The inﬂation tax is used to decrease the distortionary taxes χ on labor and capital.
4.2.4. Change in distorting taxes
In this environment, the government uses the inﬂation tax to decrease the distorting taxes on labor and capital. We thus
set μt = 0 in the individual budget constraint and government budget constraint. The inﬂation tax π ΩtΠt in the government
budget constraint directly affects the distorting taxes χt .
In this experiment, the previous insurance effect of inﬂation through the equal redistribution of the inﬂation tax is shut
down. In addition to the Tobin effect, still present in this set-up, inﬂation might now affect the economy through a new
channel. Since distortionary taxes on capital decrease with the rise in the inﬂation tax, inﬂation has an additional positive
effect on capital accumulation. Distortionary taxes on labor supply also decrease and the gap across wages net of taxes now
widens. This effect might drive a rise in labor supply.
Fig. 5 represents in dashed lines the evolution pattern of the aggregate variables as a function of inﬂation. The upper-left
panel shows that the capital stock is now monotonically increasing with inﬂation. Since the insurance channel is shut down,
there is no longer any force to counteract the positive Tobin effect of inﬂation on capital accumulation. On the contrary, the
Phelps effect of inﬂation, linked to the decrease in the capital tax, magniﬁes the positive inﬂuence of inﬂation on the capital
stock. The lower left panel of Fig. 5 documents the drop in distortionary taxes. Moving from an inﬂation rate of 0 percent
to 0.75 percent leads to a drop in capital tax by 3.5 percent.
Table 4 – line 3 shows the quantitative effect on aggregate variables of an increase in inﬂation from 0.5 percent to 0.75
percent. The rise in inﬂation has a ﬁrst order effect on distorting taxes, which decrease by 0.5 percent. The capital stock
increases now by 0.38 percent, a rise more than twice as high as the one observed in the environment with lump-sum
monetary transfers. Labor supply increases by 0.062 percent, leading to an overall increase in output by 0.182 percent.
Table 4 – line 4 shows the results in the complete market case. The change in distorting taxes leads to an increase in
labor and capital, consistently with the Phelps effect in complete markets. But the overall effect of inﬂation on capital and
output under incomplete markets is more than three times as high as the one under complete markets. The incomplete
markets environment magniﬁes the effect of monetary policy on ﬁscal policy.
4.3. Sensitivity analysis
This section runs a sensitivity analysis on the different parameters driving the real effect of inﬂation on capital accu-
mulation. We focus on three main parameters: the elasticity of money demand η, the risk aversion σ , and the borrowing
constraint. The experiments are run under the benchmark model with symmetric redistribution of the inﬂation tax, endoge-
nous labor supply and constant distorting taxes.
4.3.1. Interest elasticity of money demand
We start by looking at the value of the elasticity of substitution between goods and money, which drives the interest
elasticity of money demand. As mentioned in the calibration section, the elasticity is imprecisely estimated in the literature.
The estimated values range in most cases from 0.2 to 1. We thus look at two polar cases with η = 0.25 and η = 1. The
higher the elasticity, the higher the substitution in favor of ﬁnancial assets will occur after a hike in inﬂation. One should
thus expect a stronger positive effect of inﬂation on capital accumulation as the elasticity of money demand becomes higher.
To make the comparison meaningful, we adjust the value of ω in each case to start from the same steady state value for the
ratio (M/P )/Y . The steady states value of the capital-output ratio K/Y are also identical across the different experiments.
Fig. 6 shows the evolution-pattern of the main aggregates as a function of inﬂation for the three values of η. The upper
panel shows that the drop in money demand and the rise in capital accumulation become sharper as η gets higher. When
η = 1, the Tobin effect of substitution between ﬁnancial assets and real balances always outweigths the insurance effect
provided by the equal redistribution of the inﬂation tax. The capital stock thus increases monotonically with inﬂation,
contrary to the cases with η = 0.25 and η = 0.5. Two reasons for that. First, the Tobin effect gets stronger as mentioned
above. Second the insurance effect becomes lower as η gets higher. The reason is that the money stock, on which the
inﬂation tax is based, decreases with η. The lower-left panel documents this effect of η on the lump-sum monetary transfers.
Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis – elasticity of money demand.
In contrast, when η = 0.25, the capital reaches a peak for π equal to 0.4 percent and then decreases. The insurance effect
dominates the Tobin effect for lower level of inﬂation as the lump-sum monetary transfers becomes much higher.
Fig. 6 – lower right panel – shows that the evolution pattern of the labor supply also depends on the values of η.
Two effects alter the labor supply in this framework. First, the increase in the capital stock raises labor productivity and
real wages, favoring an increase in labor supply. Second, the distribution of the inﬂation tax provides some insurance that
decreases the incentive to work for self-insure motives. The interplay between these two effects yield different results
according to the value of η. For low values of η the distribution of the inﬂation tax tends to decrease labor supply. For high
value of η, this effect is lower and the rise in real wage increases labor supply.
4.3.1.1. Risk aversion We consider an increase in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion from 1 to 2. The environment
corresponds to the benchmark model with an elasticity of money demand η = 0.5. We adjust the discounting factor β to
start from the same stead-state value of the capital-output ratio.
Fig. 7 compares the evolution pattern of the main aggregate variables for σ = 1 and σ = 2. For a given level of inﬂation,
the demand for money increases with σ as money can be used as a buffer stock against idiosyncratic shocks. As a matter of
fact, the aggregate money stock and the lump-sums transfers are higher in an economy with σ = 2 compared to the initial
case σ = 1. The insurance effect coming from the redistribution of the inﬂation tax thus plays a higher role when σ = 2,
which decreases the incentive to accumulate ﬁnancial assets. The capital stock decreases faster with inﬂation as σ increases.
4.3.1.2. Credit constraints We end-up this section by exploring the sensitivity of the quantitative results with regard to the
strictness of the credit limit. As shown by Huggett (1993), the stringency of credit constraints can affect the equilibrium
interest rate. This effect could be all the more important in our context that the effect of inﬂation directly interact with
borrowing constraints. As a robustness check, we allow for borrowing up to 25 percent of the average annual after-tax
earnings to match the proportion of 15 percent of agents with negative wealth in the data (Wolff, 2000).
Fig. 8 compares the evolution pattern when borrowing is allowed (a < 0) and the benchmark model without any bor-
rowing. The hump-shaped relationship between capital and inﬂation still holds with a < 0 since both the Tobin effect and
the insurance effect are still at work. However the quantitative impact of inﬂation on capital accumulation is smaller when
individuals can borrow. A hike in quarterly inﬂation from 0 percent to 0.75 percent is associated with an increase by
0.83 percent of the stock of capital in an environment where individual are allowed to borrow. The rise in capital reaches
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis – risk aversion.
Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis – credit constraints.
0.91 percent in an environment without borrowing. The reason for this result is that the precautionary savings motive is
less important in the former environment since households can smooth consumption by holding debts. The wealth-poor
can adjust the hike in inﬂation by borrowing more ﬁnancial assets.
5. Conclusion
This paper studies the real effect of inﬂation in an incomplete-market economy where agents face idiosyncratic shocks.
It has been shown that inﬂation has a hump-shaped effect on output and on the aggregate capital stock due to borrow-
ing constraint and market incompleteness. First, inﬂation affects in a different way borrowing constrained households and
unconstrained households, since the former cannot adjust their ﬁnancial portfolio. This ﬁrst effect yields an increase in
precautionary savings and thus increases the capital stock. Second, the redistribution of the inﬂation tax provides some
insurance to households, who decrease in consequence their precautionary savings. The ﬁrst effect dominates for low level
of inﬂation, whereas the second effect dominates for higher level of inﬂation. Not only do incomplete markets and borrow-
ing constraints have a real quantitative impact on their own, they also amplify signiﬁcantly the other potential distorting
channels of inﬂation compared to complete market frameworks.
This paper has focused on the long-run properties of money with borrowing constraints. A promising route for future
research would be to analyze the short-run effects of monetary shocks in this type of incomplete market economy with
borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic shocks (see a ﬁrst attempt by Heer and Maussner, 2007 in a heterogeneous agents
model but without idiosyncratic shocks). This paper also abstracts from growth analysis. Kormendi and Meguire (1985),
Fisher (1991), and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have identiﬁed the negative impact of the inﬂation rate on economic
growth in alternative frameworks. The analysis of the relationship between inﬂation and growth under incomplete markets
is left for future research.
Appendix A. Solution to the households’ problem
Using the Bellman equations, the households’ problem can be written in recursive form. Stationary solutions satisfy, of
course, the usual transversality conditions. As a consequence, we can focus on the ﬁrst-order condition of the households’
problem. This is given by the program
V
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where q11, q
2
1 are given, Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1, and income shocks are deterministic: eit+1 = 0 if eit = 1, and eit+1 = 1 if eit = 0.
Using (31) and (32) to substitute for cit and q
i
t+1, we can maximize only over ait+1 and mit . Using the ﬁrst-order conditions,
together with the envelope theorem (which yields in all cases V ′(qit , eit+1) = u′c(cit ,mit)), we have
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If the equations above yield a quantity ait+1 < 0, then the borrowing constraint is binding and the solution is given by
ait+1 = 0 and u′c(cit ,mit) > βRt+1u′c(cit+1,mit+1), together with (35). In a stationary equilibrium, all H agents become L agents
the next period and vice versa. Since H agents are in the good state, they always take the opportunity to save for precau-
tionary motives and their borrowing constraints are never binding (see next section). We can rewrite the previous equations
using the state of the households instead of their type. With the logarithm utility function, this yields the expressions given
in Section 2.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 on binding borrowing constraints and the non-neutrality of money
In this proof, we assume as a ﬁrst step that borrowing constraints are binding for L households to derive the equilibrium
interest rate. In a second step, we check that borrowing constraints are actually binding for L agents but not for H agents.
By using Proposition 1, it will suﬃce to check that the equilibrium interest rate satisﬁes 1+ r < 1
β
.
First, by using the ﬁrst-order condition (8), we obtain c
L
cH
= β(1 + r). Equilibrium on the goods market implies that
cH + cL = Kα − K , and the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm imply that 1+ r = αKα−1 and w = (1−α)Kα . Substituting for
cH ,w and K we obtain
cL = β 1+ r − α
β(1+ r) + 1
(
α
1+ r
) α
1−α
The budget constraint of L agents, given by (7), yields
mL
cL
− m
H
cH
cH
cL
= a
H (1+ r) − cL
cL
Using the value of the ratio c
L
cH
= β(1+ r) and the expressions (13) and (14), one ﬁnds
f (r) = g(r,Π) (36)
Fig. 9. Existence of an equilibrium with 1+ r < 1/β .
with
f (r) ≡ φ
1− φ
(
α
β(1+ r) + 1
1+ r − α − β
)
and g(r,Π) ≡ β
1− β2
Π
(1+ r)
− 1
1+ r − 1
Π
Eq. (36) determines the equilibrium interest rate as a function of the parameters of the model and Π . We now have to
prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
B.1. Existence of a solution with binding borrowing constraints
Recall that we assume that α < 1/Π < 1/β . We then look for the existence of a solution r∗ such that 1+r∗ ∈ (1/Π;1/β).
If such a solution exists, borrowing constraints are binding and both money and ﬁnancial titles are held in equilibrium.
Note that f (r) is continuous in r, for 1 + r ∈ ( 1
Π
; 1
β
) and f takes ﬁnite values at the boundaries 1
Π
and 1
β
. For a
given value of Π , g(r,Π) is continuous in r for 1 + r ∈ ( 1
Π
; 1
β
). However, g(r,Π) −→ −∞ when 1 + r ∈ ( 1
Π
; 1
β
) and
1 + r −→ 1/Π . And g( 1
β
− 1,Π) = 0. As a result, a suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium to exist is f ( 1
β
− 1) < 0. This
condition is equivalent to α < 1/(2 + β). Hence, if α < 1/(2 + β), there exists an equilibrium interest rate r∗ such that
1+ r∗ ∈ (1/Π;1/β). From Proposition 1, borrowing constraints are binding in such an equilibrium. 
B.2. Uniqueness and variations
Note that f (r) is decreasing in r when 1+ r ∈ ( 1
Π
; 1
β
) as α < 1/Π (a simple derivative of f ). We can show that g(r,Π)
is increasing in r. As a result, the solution is unique, for continuity reasons. Finally, we can show that g(r,Π) is increasing
in Π . Deﬁne a function h such that
h(y) = y
3(1+ r)3
(1+ r − y2
Π
(1+ r)2)2
(37)
The function h is positive and increasing in y. Now, the derivative g′Π(r,Π) can be written as g′(Π) = 1Π2 (h( 11+r ) − h(β)).
At the equilibrium 1/(1+ r∗) > β , and hence we have g′Π(r∗,Π) > 0.
Consequently, by the implicit function theorem f (r∗) = g(r∗,Π) deﬁnes implicitly r∗ as a decreasing function of Π .
Fig. 9 illustrates the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints. 
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